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The Constitutionality of Statutory
Criminal Presumptionst
Statutory criminal presumptions can aid a prosecutor in securing con-
victions and provide incentive to the accused to produce evidence.
However, by lightening the criminal burden of proof, by providing
opportunity for prosecutions on insubstantial evidence, or by requir-
ing inconsistent jury instructions, such presumptions may collide with a
number of constitutional principles-among them due process notions
of fairness, established views of the proper functions of judge and jury,
the right to a jury trial itself, and the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion.1 This comment undertakes to examine the Supreme Court's
recent attempts to resolve these tensions in the use of statutory criminal
presumptions.2
A principal source of confusion is the frequent failure of courts and
legislatures to specify the impact of a rebuttable criminal presumption
on the admissibility of evidence, the burden of going forward with
evidence, and the burden of persuasion. When treated as permitting an
inference3 (the basic fact is to be submitted to the jury only as some
evidence of the presumed fact), the presumption disadvantages the
accused no more than he would have been absent the presumption, un-
less the basic fact would otherwise have been excludable, which is rare,
or unless the judge is required to call special attention to the inference
in his instructions. When a presumption describes prima facie evi-
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1 Criminal presumptions are treated in 1 JONES, EVMENCE §§ 9-119 (5th ed. 1958);
McCoRMICK, EvIDENCE 635-72 (1954); Brosman, The Statutory Presumption, 5 TUL. L.
REV. 178, 196-202 (1931); Keeton, Statutory Presumptions-Their Constitutionality and
Legal Effect, 10 TExAs L. REv. 34, 43-50 (1931); Orfield, Burden of Proof and Presump-
tions in Federal Criminal Cases, 31 U. KAN. Crry L. REv. 30 (1963); Note, Tot v. United
States: Constitutional Restrictions on Statutory Presumptions, 56 HARV. L. REv. 1324
(1943); Note, 55 COLuTm. L. REv. 527, 541-47 (1955).
2 United States v. Romano, 382 U.S. 136 (1965); United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63
(1965).
3 United States v. Ross, 92 U.S. 281, 284 (1875). For a complete catalogue of meanings
of both civil and criminal presumptions see Laughlin, In Support of the Thayer Theory
of Presumptions, 52 MICH. L. REv. 195 (1953); Keeton, supra note 1.
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dence4 in the sense that the basic fact, if found to exist, is sufficient
evidence of the presumed fact to support a verdict of guilty and the
jury is so instructed, the accused is disadvantaged only insofar as the
quantum of evidence necessary to support a verdict of guilty may be
lessened. In addition, a presumption may allow or require an instruc-
tion that the jury is "authorized" to find the presumed fact from the
basic fact. This will probably tend to persuade the jury that the pre-
sumed fact does exist, and is especially important in those jurisdictions
where comment on the evidence is otherwise prohibited.
A third possible impact of a presumption is that, upon production
by the prosecutor of evidence of the basic fact, the burden of going
forward with evidence negativing the presumed fact shifts to the ac-
cused 5 and failure to carry the burden results in foreclosure of the
issue against the accused. The effect of shifting this burden is to place
the risk of nonproduction upon the accused; 6 and the extent of this
risk depends upon the quantum of evidence necessary to carry the
burden.7 Apparently because foreclosure seems to be a harsh penalty
it has seldom been employed in criminal cases.8
Finally, a presumption can mean that proof of the basic fact shifts
to the accused the burden of persuasion as to the presumed fact.9 Such
a shift places upon the accused the risk of non-persuasion of the jury.10
However, a shift in this burden is almost always accompanied by a shift
in the burden of going forward. 11
Prior to Tot v. United States12 the Supreme Court appeared to have
adopted two alternative tests to aid in determining the constitutionality
of criminal presumptions, and a third test seemed incipient.13 The "ra-
4 E.g., Luria v. United States, 231 U.S. 9, 26-27 (1913); Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219,
238-39 (1911).
5 E.g., Casey v. United States, 276 U.S. 413 (1928) (semble).
6 See 9 WiGMORE, EVEDENcE §§ 2487, 2489, 2491 (3d ed. 1940).
7 The quantum of evidence necessary to rebut the presumption and whether judge or
jury should determine when it has been rebutted has been the subject of much debate.
See generally Keeton, supra note 1; Laughlin, supra note 2.
8 See text accompanying notes 80-82 inIra. The Reporter for the MODEL PENAL CODE
proposed the use of foreclosure but this was not adopted, MODEL PENAL CODE, § 1.13 at
8-9, comment at 116-17 (rent. Draft No. 4, 1955). In contrast is the general practice in
civil cases, where the normal consequence of failure to discharge the burden of going
forward is foreclosure of the issue against the failing party.
9 E.g., Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82, 96 (1934); Yee Hem v. United States, 268 U.S.
178 (1925); Hawes v. Georgia, 258 U.S. 1 (1922). These cases shifted both burdens.
310 See 9 WIGMORE, EviDENCE § 2485 (3d ed. 1940).
11 See authorities cited note 9 supra.
12 319 U.S. 463 (1943).
13 In apparent recognition of the complexity of presumptions the Court has eschewed
the notion that there is any single determinative test. See Morrison v. California, 291
U.S. 82 (1934).
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tional connection" test, which had been applied to the latter three of
the foregoing varieties of presumptions, 14 required the existence of a
probative relation between the presumed fact and the basic fact such
that the existence of the basic fact made more probable than not the
existence of the presumed fact.15 The "comparative convenience" test
had received its only application in Morrison v. California, in which
the Court struck down a state statute making it a crime to conspire to
put an alien in possession of land and shifting to the accused the
burdens of persuasion and going forward with evidence as to the citi-
zenship of his alleged co-conspirator. 16 This test required that "upon a
balancing of convenience or of the opportunities for knowledge the
shifting of the burden will be found to be an aid to the accuser without
subjecting the accused to hardship or oppression."' 7 The third test,
devised by Mr. Justice Holmes and applied only in one civil case, re-
quired analysis of the elements of the statute creating liability; if the
element which the presumption is designed to help establish could
have been omitted or replaced by the basic fact without impairing the
statute's constitutionality, then the presumption was likewise consti-
tutional.'8
The Court in Tot put an apparent end to the development of these
three tests as alternatives, establishing the rational connection standard
as paramount with comparative convenience as a corollary and ex-
pressly rejecting the Holmes test in its entirety. 19 Tot had been con-
victed under the Federal Firearms Act making it unlawful for one
previously convicted of a crime of violence to receive any firearm in
interstate commerce after June 30, 1938 and providing that "possession
of a firearm... by any such person shall be presumptive evidence that
such firearm ... was ... received ... by such person in violation of
14 E.g., Luria v. United States, 231 U.S. 9 (1913) (prima fade); Casey v. United States,
276 U.S. 413 (1928) (burden of going forward); Yee Hem v. United States, 268 U.S. 178
(1925) (burden of persuasion). On the ambiguity of the term "rational connection" see
McCoPMI C, supra note 1, at 659-63.
15 See Yee Hem v. United States, 268 U.S. 178 (1925).
16 291 U.S. 82 (1934).
17 Id. at 89.
18 Ferry v. Ramsey, 277 U.S. 88 (1928). McCormick notes two other possible tests which
had received only very uncertain recognition by the courts. First was Wigmore's view
that any presumption was constitutional if its only effect was to shift the burden of
going forward, because the defendant can always introduce evidence and the jury can
be relied upon to evaluate the resulting record fairly. Second was the very ambiguous
test in Westesn & A. R.R. v. Henderson, 279 U.S. 639 (1929), which "appears to gauge the
validity of the presumption there involved by the effect given to it at the trial." The
presumption was given weight as evidence, and the Court struck it down as arbitrary.
McCoRmIcK, supra note 1, at 654-63.
19 319 U.S. at 467-68, 472; see McCoRmicK, supra note 1, at 654-63.
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this Act." 20 The only evidence adduced by the Government was that
on September 20, 1938, Tot was found to be in possession of a firearm,
and that he had previously been convicted of assault and battery.21 The
Court held that there was insufficient rational connection between
possession of a firearm on September 20, 1938 and interstate receipt
after June 30, 1938, and thus the presumption was an unconstitutional
deprivation of due process. 22
Unfortunately the Court did not specify which of the functional
definitions of presumption was applicable to the Tot presumption.
In fact the opinion mentioned all four types; and because of this
ambiguity the decision lends itself to a variety of interpretations. 23
It is possible to read the case as being primarily concerned with pre-
sumptions which depend upon the jury to give effect to an inference
from the basic fact to the presumed fact.24 Such is the situation when
the presumption prescribes a prima facie case. Requiring a rational con-
nection would then seem to reflect the view that it is unhealthy for the
jury to be given discretion to find the existence of the facts irrationally,
as it would be if a case were allowed to go to the jury when the state
of the evidence was such that no rational jury would find the relevant
facts to exist. This reading of the case requires recognition that due
process includes the notion of rational control of the jury by the judge,
a new though not necessarily misplaced principle of due process. Even
the Tot rule, however, was not completely consistent with rational
control of the jury by the judge. Dictum in Tot indicated that the
rational connection between the basic and presumed fact could be less
than an inference beyond a reasonable doubt, but the presumption
could still be constitutional. 25 1 Hence the judge might be compelled by
the presumption to submit an issue of fact to the jury although the
state of the evidence was such that no rational jury could find the
presumed fact to exist beyond a reasonable doubt.
Another interpretation of Tot finds its origin in the Court's apparent
concern for protecting persons from the harassment by prosecutors
which could result if the state were required to produce evidence only
as to some issues before the burden of going forward with evidence as
to the remaining issues shifted to the accused. Thus the Court rejected
20 52 Stat. 1250 (1938).
21 319 U.S. at 464.
22 Id. at 467-68.
23 See Note, Tot v. United States: Constitutional Restrictions on Statutory Presumptions,
56 HAtv. L. REV. 1324 (1943).
24 819 U.S. at 467.
25 The opinion is unclear as to how much evidence is required by the national con-
nection test, although it does indicate in dictum that a presumption could be "created
upon a view of relation broader than that a jury might take in a specific case." Id. at 468.
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comparative convenience as an independent test for allocating the
burden because the defendant always has easier access to the relevant
facts.2 6 The rational connection test is consistent with this underly-
ing policy since its application would assure that the state adduce a
minimum quantum of evidence tending to establish the existence of
any presumed fact before the burden of going forward with evidence
of its non-existence is shifted to the accused. Thus insistence upon a
rational connection would provide the accused some protection against
the temptation of prosecutors aided by a presumption to institute pro-
ceedings when there is insufficient reason to believe that the accused
committed the crime. This rationale would appear to apply with equal
force to presumptions whose effect is to prescribe a prima facie case;
indeed, a rational connection had always been required in such cases
before Tot.27
There is no doubt that requiring a rational connection would miti-
gate harassment, but other less restrictive standards might yield the
same result. One could, for example, judge presumptions according to
whether they required the prosecution to come forward with evidence
on such elements of the crime as would cast suspicion on the accused
in the eyes of a reasonable man.28 However, such standards would be
difficult to articulate and apply,29 and it is doubtful that the Court even
considered alternatives since the rational connection test presented a
ready-made solution.
The decision in Tot is particularly unclear with regard to the status
of presumptions which shift the burden of persuasion. There is no
danger that such a presumption would become a vehicle of harassment
providing the burden of going forward remains upon the state, for
until the state has adduced evidence upon which a rational jury could
find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt the accused is entitled to a
directed verdict of acquittal. After that burden has been carried a shift
in the burden of persuasion would provide additional incentive beyond
that provided by the mere introduction of evidence of guilt for the
accused to produce whatever evidence he may have. Nor would there
26 "If [the argument from comparative convenience] were sound, the legislature might
validly command that the finding of an indictment, or mere proof of identity of the
accused, should create a presumption of the existence of all the facts essential to guilt."
319 U.S. at 469. See MCCORMICK, supra note 1, at 661-62.
27 Authorities cited note 4 supra. See also Western & Ad. R.R. v. Henderson, 279 U.S.
639, 642 (1929) (civil case).
28 Cf. MODEL PENAL CODE, § 1.13, comment at 111, 116-17 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
This is apparently the rationale upon which the constitutionality of affirmative defenses
is predicated, see Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 799 (1952), and accords with ancient
notions of malum in se.
29 See McCoRMIcK, supra note 1, at 659-63.
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be any problem of rational jury control, since the jury is not afforded
the opportunity to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on the strength
of the presumption. Several prior cases, however, held that a rational
connection was required in order to shift the burden of persuasion,30
and while Morrison suggested that comparative convenience was suffi-
cient to justify such a shift,31 Tot expressly reinterpreted that case to
mean that comparative convenience was a necessary but not sufficient
condition. 2 The necessary implication of this position is that the
location of the burden of persuasion is a constitutional matter. The
burden must be upon the state initially and may not be shifted until
the constitutional tests of Tot are satisfied. Although the source of this
principle was presumably the due process clause,33 it is difficult to
perceive any more precise underlying policy than the vague notion of
fairness to the criminal accused.
A further troublesome feature of the Tot opinion was the omission
of any discussion of affirmative defenses, which are different from pre-
sumptions, if at all, only in that both burdens are placed upon the
accused at the outset. 34 Allocation at the outset is functionally equiva-
lent to shifting the burdens as to the defensive elements upon the
prosecution's having adduced sufficient evidence on all other elements
to withstand a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal. The most
familiar affirmative defenses are insanity and self-defense, and it can
hardly be maintained that there is any compelling inference of the
accused's sanity or aggressive posture from the fact that he has com-
mitted an intentional homicide.35 Although consistency would thus
seem to demand that the court strike down such allocations of burden,
in Leland v. Oregon the Court held constitutional a statute placing
upon the accused the burden of- going forward and the burden of
persuasion beyond a reasonable doubt on the issue of sanity.38 Tot was
distinguished on the grounds that the basic fact there was "neither
criminal in itself nor an element of the crime charged."3 , As suggested
previously, these factors might serve as an alternative constitutional
standard to that espoused in Tot,3 8 while protecting equally well
30 E.g., Western & Ati. R.R. v. Henderson, 279 U.S. 639 (1929) (civil); Yee Hem v.
United States, 268 U.S. 178 (1925); Hawes v. Georgia, 258 U.S. 1 (1922); Wilson v. United
States, 162 U.S. 613 (1896).
31 291 U.S. 82, 89, 96 (1934).
32 319 U.S. at 469-70.
33 319 U.S. at 467.
34 Cf. MODEL PENAL CODE, § 1.13, comment at 110-12, 116-17 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
35 Id. at 111.
36 343 U.S. 790 (1952).
37 Id. at 799.
s8 See United States v. Fleischman, 339 U.S. 349 (1950).
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against harassment. They do not, however, point to any significant
difference in the effects of presumptions and affirmative defenses.
The final difficulty with Tot was the manner in which the Court
rejected the Holmes test. It was argued that since Congress could have
made possession of all firearms by former felons a crime, in order to
protect interstate commerce it could do less and punish only those who
could not show that the weapon possessed was not acquired in inter-
state commerce. The Court's reply was quite unclear but implied that
it was only the statute enacted with which the Court could be con-
cerned, not the potential power of the legislature.39 Why this should be
so is certainly not self-evident, but there is a stronger argument for
rejecting the Holmes test than that put forth by the Court. Even the
proponents of the test recognize that determining the minimum facts
for which the state can constitutionally impose liability is a very diffi-
cult task for which only the vaguest standards exist.40 It is thus perhaps
excusable for the Court to eschew a test which would involve such an
inquiry. Moreover, this test, applied without regard to the inferential
strength of the presumption or its procedural consequences, could sus-
tain presumptions having defects similar to presumptions based solely
on comparative convenience. In particular, rational control of the jury
would be difficult should the basic and presumed facts lack probative
relation when the presumption prescribes a prima facie case. Consider
the plight of a judge attempting to instruct a jury when the presumed
fact is an element of the offense but the evidence presented tends only
to establish an empirically unrelated basic fact. This difficulty would
not be present, however, when the presumption shifts one of the bur-
dens of proof and the jury is instructed only as to the shift and not as
to any inference. It must also be conceded that neither of the objec-
tions to the Holmes test approaches constitutional stature; they are
matters of judicial convenience. The logic of his position is unassail-
able.
The understanding of the state of law after Tot v. United States is
most clearly reflected in the Model Penal Code, which provides:
When the Code establishes a presumption with respect to
any fact which is an element of an offense, it had the
following consequences:
(a) when there is evidence of the facts which give rise to
39 "[I]t is plain that Congress . . . did not seek to pronounce general prohibition of
possession by certain residents of the various states of firearms in order to protect inter-
state commerce, but dealt only with their future acquisition in interstate commerce."
319 U.S. at 472. See Note, 55 CoLuM. L. Rav. 527, 534 (1955).
40 See Note, 55 CoLuM. L. Rav. 527, 544-45 (1955).
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the presumption, the issue of the existence of the presumed
fact must be submitted to the jury, unless the Court is
satisfied that the evidence as a whole clearly negatives the
presumed fact; and,
(b) when the issue of the existence of the presumed fact
is submitted to the jury, the Court shall charge that while
the presumed fact must, on all the evidence, be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt, the law declares that the jury
may regard the facts giving rise to the presumption as suffi-
cient evidence of the presumed fact.41
In justification of the constitutionality of this definition, the com-
mentary notes that "the Code will not establish a presumption unless
the basic facts standing alone are strongly probative of the presumed
fact in light of general experience, and unless the presumption does not
cast an unfair burden on the defendant. '42 Examples of Code presump-
tions are: where a child under the age of eighteen is removed from the
custody of its parent, that proof that the child's age was less than eigh-
teen years gives rise to a presumption "that the actor knew the child's
age or acted in reckless disregard thereof;" 43 and with regard to the
receipt of stolen property by a dealer, knowledge is presumed from his
having "received stolen property in another transaction within the year
preceding the transaction charged." 44 Although there might be some
question as to the sufficiency of the rational connection involved in
certain of the presumptions, nothing in Tot or the cases preceding it
suggests that the Code presumptions are unconstitutional in their ef-
fect. These presumptions will serve as useful referents for subsequent
analysis, since their validity is no longer clear.
Two cases recently decided by the Supreme Court appear to place
severe strictures upon the operation of statutory presumptions in
criminal cases. United States v. Gainey45 involved a conviction for
carrying on "the business of a distiller or rectifier without having given
bond as required by law."46 Section 5601(b)(2) of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954 provides that proof of the presence of the accused at a
still while the business of a distiller was being conducted "shall be
deemed sufficient evidence to authorize conviction, unless the defen-
dant explains such presence to the satisfaction of the jury. .. .,,4 Al-
41 MODEL PENAL CODE, § 1.12(5) (Prop. Off. Draft 1952).
42 MODEL PENAL CODE, § 1.18, comment at 117 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
43 Id. at § 212.4.
44 Id. at § 223.6(2)(b). Other presumptions appear in sections 5.06(2), 5.06(3), 223.7(1),
223.8, 230.3(3), and 251.2(4).
45 380 U.S. 63 (1965).
46 72 Stat. 1398-99 (1958), 26 U.S.C. § 5601(a)(4) (1964).
47 72 Stat. 1398-99 (1958), 26 U.S.C. § 5601(b)(2) (1964).
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though the presumption seems to shift the burden of persuasion to the
accused, the judge charged the jury that even should the accused fail
to explain his presence satisfactorily the jury was not required to con-
vict, rather that the law merely declared that the jury may, "if it sees
fit," convict upon evidence of presence alone.48 The Fifth Circuit
reversed on the ground that the inference from presence to "carry-
ing on" was insufficient to satisfy the due process requirement of Tot.49
The Supreme Court reversed.50 Noting that the rationality of an in-
ference was an empirical question much more within the competence
of Congress than the judiciary and that the offense described included
any act connected with distilling, the Court concluded: "Legislative
recognition of the implications of seclusion [of an illegal still] .only
confirms what the folklore teaches-that strangers to the illegal busi-
ness rarely penetrate the curtain of secrecy. We therefore hold that
§ 5601(b)(2) satisfies the test of Tot v. United States.. .. "51
A few months later, however, in United States v. Romano,5 2 the
Court recurred to the issue of rational connection in striking down
a presumption sister to that in Gainey for lack of inferential strength.
The crime involved was possession, custody, or control of an unregis-
tered still; again unexplained presence was declared sufficient evidence
to support a conviction.53 The Court observed that unlike "carrying
on," "possession" is only one of several functions that one present at a
still might be performing, hence there was insufficient rational con-
nection.54 In reaching this conclusion the Court repeatedly adverted to
cases decided prior to enactment of the presumption holding presence
insufficient evidence of possession to justify a conviction.55
Before discussing the effects of these cases two further aspects of
Gainey must be mentioned. It was there contended that the presump-
tion was unconstitutional because it impinged upon the trial judge's
powers over the judicial proceeding.56 Noting that the "Constitution
places in the hands of the trial judge the responsibility for safe-
guarding the integrity of the jury trial, including the right to have a
case withheld from the jury when the evidence is insufficient as a
48 380 U.S. 63 (1965).
49 Barrett v. United States, 322 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1963).
50 380 U.S. at 71.
51 Id. at 67-68.
52 382 U.S. 136 (1965).
53 Id. at 137. The statute appears at 72 Stat. 1398-99 (1958), 26 U.S.C. § 5601(a)(1),
(b)(1) (1964).
54 382 U.S. at 139-41.
55 Id. at 140, 141.
56 380 US. at 68.
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matter of law to support the conviction," the Court construed the
statute as mere permission to the judge, rather than any compulsion
upon him, to submit the case to the jury when the only evidence is
possession and indicated that such a submission was reviewable.5 7
Moreover, implying that a further constitutional stricture existed, the
Court noted that the presumption did not prevent the jury from being
properly instructed as to reasonable doubt, and that the judge had
correctly charged that the jury could acquit if it found that the Govern-
ment had not proved guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.58 Both of these
subsidiary holdings came in response to Mr. Justice Black's contention
in dissent that the presumption violated several constitutional provi-
sions. Thus they appear to have a constitutional basis rather than status
as rules governing the federal judiciary.59
In neither Gainey nor Romano did the Court make clear which type
of presumption the statute created. It did, however, recognize that the
presumption was patterned after that upheld in Yee Hem v. United
States;6 0 and it is reasonably clear from that case that the presumption
was understood to shift both burdens to the accused.61 Moreover,
whatever ambiguity remains is mitigated by the Court's discussion of
the Gainey presumption in terms of certain constitutionally prohibited
effects which this particular presumption avoided, thereby indicating
that any type of presumption with such effects would be unconstitu-
tional. The following discussion will suggest that Gainey and Romano
have two principal results: (1) presumptions prescribing the quantum
of evidence necessary for the prosecutor to get to the jury cannot
constitutionally disadvantage the accused more than he would be had
the presumption not existed; and (2) presumptions shifting the burden
of persuasion to the accused are unconstitutional.
Earlier it was seen that certain presumptions establish a prima facie
case to enable the prosecutor to get his case to the jury. For such
presumptions to be effective the quantum of evidence required by
the presumption must be less than that required by ordinary ju-
dicial standards for sufficient evidence (evidence upon which a ra-
tional jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt).62 Romano,
however, seems to imply that the inferential strength constitutionally
required for a presumption is the same as that required by the judicial
57 Id. at 68.
58 Id. at 68-69.
59 Id. at 74-88.
60 268 U.S. 178 (1925), cited in 380 U.S. at 64 n.2.
61 268 U.S. at 184-85.
62 See 9 WIGMoax, EvmrDEcE § 2494 (3d ed. 1940), and authorities cited note 17 therein.
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standard. The principal authorities marshalled by the Court to support
its conclusion that there was no "rational connection" are cases in the
Supreme Court and lower federal courts holding as a matter of law
that presence is insufficient evidence of possession.63 Typical is the
Court's statement that:
The United States has presented no cases in the courts
which have sustained a conviction for possession based solely
on the evidence of presence. All of the cases which deal with
this issue and with which we are familiar have held presence
alone, unilluminated by other facts, to be insufficient proof
of possession.64
Since the Court was fully aware that the presumptions were enacted
to overcome these very precedents65 it would appear that the Court has
rejected its dicta in Tot and established an identity between constitu-
tional and judicial standards.
One argument against accepting this interpretation of Romano is
that the inferential strength of the Romano presumption is probably
not even that of a preponderance of the evidence and thus would not
satisfy even the test of the Tot dictum; but there is no indication that
the Court recognized this fact. More troublesome is reconciling iden-
tity of the standards with the holding in Gainey that the judge could
refuse to send the case to the jury solely on evidence of unexplained
presence, for if the standards are identical the judge would be re-
quired by the judicial standard alone to send the case to the jury
in such circumstances. There is language which suggests, however, that
the Gainey rule permitting judicial disregard of the presumption
applies only when the inferential weight neither clearly satisfies nor
fails to satisfy the judicial standard.66 In such a case congressional
determination that the basic fact is of high probative value is given
some weight by permitting the judge to submit the case to the jury on
evidence of the basic fact alone if he agrees with Congress. Although
such judicial discretion makes for a rather clumsy system, it would be
even more difficult to rationalize judicial discretion if the constitu-
tionally required weight for a presumption were merely a preponder-
ance of evidence. In that case there seems to be no standard by which
63 382 U.S. at 140, 141 n.7.
64 Id. at 141.
65 Id. at 142.
06 "Yet it is precisely when courts have been unable to agree as to the exact relevance
of a frequently occurring fact in an atmosphere pregnant with illegality that Congress'
resolution is appropriate." 380 U.S. at 67.
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a judge could decide whether to submit the case to the jury. The only
other reconciliation of the two cases would require viewing Romano as
modifying Gainey by establishing the identity of the constitutional
and judicial standards, thus overruling those portions of the Gai-
ney opinion dealing with judicial discretion and the weight to be
given Congressional empirical determinations. The Court, however,
clearly viewed Gainey and Romano as completely consistent.67
Although the result seemingly reached by the Court is quite radical,
there is a strong case to be made in its support. As previously discussed,
a presumption which sends the case to the jury when the state of the
evidence is such that a rational jury could not find guilt beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, yet demands that the jury be instructed as to reasonable
doubt, clearly relies for its effect on the expectation that the jury will
disregard that instruction. Indeed, when coupled with an authorizing
instruction the presumption is tantamount to inviting the jury to do so.
Such a device is hardly conducive to a rational or just jury system.68
In spite of the requirement of greater inferential strength in pre-
sumptions, there is one other way in which the prosecutor might
benefit from a presumption which depends upon the jury to give effect
to a prescribed inference. If the jury is instructed that the Congress
or legislature regards the basic fact as sufficient evidence to justify a
conviction they are quite likely to give great weight to that fact.69
Thus a prosecutor receives a bonus for making out his case. Gainey
and Romano, however, substantially deprive statutory criminal pre-
sumption of even this effect in the federal courts at least, for while
approving the judge's instruction in Gainey, the Court made it clear
that "better practice" would be to omit from the charge any reference
to the statute.7 0 But an instruction which merely called attention to
presence as one circumstance to be considered as persuasive would be,
as the Court itself observed, no more than is permissable absent any
presumption.71 This "bonus" to the prosecutor is thus likely to occur
only in state courts.
At this point it is useful to recur to the Model Penal Code to observe
the full effect of Gainey and Romano. First, it would appear that many
of the Code presumptions could be attacked as unconstitutional due
67 382 U.S. at 139-40.
68 MODEL PENAL CODE, § 1.13, comment at 111, 116-17 (rent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
69 See United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 74-88 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting).
70 Id. at 71 n.7.
71 Id. at 70.
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to lack of requisite inferential strength. For example, from evidence
that a child was younger than eighteen years a jury could not always
find beyond a reasonable doubt that the person who removed the child
from the custody of its parent knew that the child was younger than
eighteen years;72 the child might, for instance, be seventeen. That this
presumption is designed to comport with the rational connection test
of Tot is no guarantee that it could survive the application of Gainey
and Romano. Second, the Code cannot require that the issue of the
existence of a presumed fact go to the jury, unless perhaps the basic
fact is clearly sufficient evidence of the presumed fact.73 Finally, in-
structing the jury that the law declares that the basic fact is sufficient
evidence is contrary to the Court's notion of "better practice," but
for the present at least this remains federal, not constitutional doctrine.
Little, then, would appear to remain either of the Code's general defi-
nition or of some of its specific presumptions.
The second principal effect of Gainey appears to be the constitu-
tional proscription, contrary to the implication in Tot, of any presump-
tion which shifts the burden of persuasion to the accused. Although
the language of the Gainey presumption seems to shift this burden,
the Court went out of its way to show that the burden remained upon
the Government.7 4 In part this seems to be a response to Mr. Justice
Black's contention in dissent that the presumption deprived the ac-
cused of his right to a trial by jury because it involved telling the jury
that certain evidence shall be sufficient to convict.75 But had either
the majority or the dissenters been willing to acknowledge the pos-
sibility that the burden of persuasion could be shifted, the contention
that there was deprivation of right to trial by jury would be fragile,
for it is only unexplained presence that is sufficient to convict, and the
jury would be completely free to evaluate the explanation.
Unfortunately the Court was probably unaware of the necessary
implications of its language, hence it is difficult to predict its reaction
should the issue of the validity of a shift of the burden of persuasion
be squarely presented. Of course there have been several instances
when presumptions shifting the burden have been approved, but even
72 MODEL PENAL CODE, § 212.4 (Prop. Off. Draft 1962).
73 See text accompanying notes 68-69 supra. With regard to the type of presumption
which depends for its effect upon establishing an evidentiary threshold for getting the
issue of the existence of the presumed fact to the jury, it should be noted that by raising
the standard for inferential strength the Court appears to have disapproved sub silento
the results reached in several of its own precedents. See cases cited notes 4-5 supra.
74 380 U.S. at 68-71.
75 Id. at 77-78. cf. State v. Lawrence, 120 Utah 323, 234 P.2d 600 (1951).
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in these cases it does not seem to have been argued to the Court that
such a shift was in itself unconstitutional.7 6 Prediction becomes even
more difficult in light of the nature of the arguments, both for and
against constitutionality, since they must rest upon the vaguest of
notions-"fairness to the accused." This turns upon resolution of one
of the issues most plaguing the present Court, how to balance the need
of society for effective law enforcement with the desire to avoid mis-
taken convictions of the innocent.7 7 It should be emphasized, however,
that neither of the policies of rational jury control or prevention of
harassment militate against a shift in the burden of persuasion, pro-
vided the burden of going forward is not shifted. The only identifiable
consequence of a permanent shift in the burden of persuasion on an
issue is that juries would find it easier to convict because any doubt on
the issue would be resolved against the accused. But perhaps the per-
manent shift of this risk to the accused is sufficiently contrary to our
traditions to be considered a violation of due process.7 8
There remains one type of presumption to be examined in light of
Gainey and Romano: that shifting the burden of going forward on
penalty of the accused's having the issue of the existence of the pre-
sumed fact foreclosed against him. Depending upon the willingness
and ability of the accused to go forward, such a presumption has a
greater or lesser adverse effect upon him than a presumption shifting
the burden of persuasion. If the accused fails to produce evidence after
the burden is shifted, the effect is more serious since the jury has no
choice but to find the presumed fact. If the accused goes forward with
the evidence, however, the presumption completely disappears, whereas
a shift in the burden of persuasion appears to be permanent. In view
of these effects two minimum requirements would seem to be necessary
to prevent gross unfairness and harassment; the presumption should
satisfy the comparative convenience test and some other test which
would assure that the prosecution had produced substantial incrimi-
nating evidence before the shift in burden takes place. In addition,
such a presumption would be more palatable if the burden to be car-
ried by the accused were no more than producing a quantum of evi-
76 See cases cited note 9 supra.
77 See, e.g., Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963);
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). See also Barrett v. United States, 322 F.2d 292,
296 (5th Cir. 1963).
78 See MCCORMICK, EvIDENCE 661-62 (1954).
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dence upon which a rational jury could find the nonexistence of the
presumed fact more probable than its existence.7 9
With regard to a presumption that met these criteria it is still neces-
sary to inquire whether the Gainey-Romano rational connection and
judicial discretion requirements are applicable and whether the poli-
cies against shifting the burden of persuasion would result in consti-
tutional proscription of this type of presumption as well. The former
requirements would, of course, seriously weaken the effect of the pre-
sumption, but there seems to be no reason to apply them. Both appear
to be a response to the presumption which amounted to an invitation
to the jury to convict on rationally insufficient evidence. Here there is
no such problem, for the jury is instructed to take as given the pre-
sumed fact and proceed to a rational evaluation of the other evidence.
Or if the accused has adequately gone forward no additional instruc-
tions are necessary at all.
The existence of a constitutional principle prohibiting any shift in
the burden of persuasion presents greater difficulties. If the right to a
jury trial includes the right to have the existence of each element of
the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt foreclosure would appear
to be an unconstitutional sanction. Moreover, a presumption sanc-
tioned by foreclosure could result in a virtual directed verdict of guilty
should the accused admit the existence of the basic fact and all ele-
ments of the crime, except the presumed fact, but introduce no evi-
dence. As was seen with regard to shifting the burden of persuasion,
however, such considerations are only a part of an overall evaluation
of due process notions of fairness. While it is difficult to make many
conclusive statements about such an inquiry, it is possible to sharpen
the issue. Only if there is a right not to produce evidence can it be
said that the accused is injured by shift in the burden of going forward,
which unlike the shift in burden of persuasion is temporary; for it is
only in case of non-production that foreclosure will operate. If fairness
involves such a right it must be because some significant risk of non-
existence of evidence or of self-incrimination is being placed upon the
accused. The comparative convenience test, however, precludes this
shift except when the accused would have easy access to the required
evidence, hence he cannot be burdened with any significant risk of not
being able to produce the evidence. As to the possibility of the defen-
dant being able to produce only self-incriminating evidence, the Su-
preme Court in both Yee Hem and Gainey rejected the contention that
79 Compare MODEL PENAL CODE, § 1.13 at 8 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955) (alternative pro-
posal of the Reporter).
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the accused was deprived of this fifth amendment right by a shift in
either burden.8 0 Consequently there appear to be no substantial
grounds supporting any right not to produce evidence.
There is even less reason for finding the existence of such a right if
affirmative defenses are still valid devices. Neither Gainey nor Romano
adverted to affirmative defenses, hence their status is once again in
doubt. It was, however, suggested in the opinion of the court of appeals
in Gainey that only the historically accepted defenses such as insanity
and self-defense were presently constitutionally acceptable as affirma-
tive defenses."' This would be a certain, though inconsistent, way to
esolve the present tension, otherwise Congress could constitutionally
make presence at an unregistered still a crime and require the accused
to prove as an affirmative defense that he was not in possession or con-
trol of the still.82
It is appropriate to conclude this discussion of criminal statutory
presumptions by noting the existence of a logical difficulty which
underlies not only the judicial evaluation of presumptions but suffi-
ciency of evidence and judicial notice as well. All of these notions
necessarily assume the ability of the judiciary to make difficult empiri-
cal judgments with accuracy. Justice Stewart paid passing respect to
this problem in Gainey when he noted that deference to Congress was
appropriate in matters empirical. But even he felt called upon to
support the accuracy of the inference by reference to "folklore."83
However, the readiest solution to this empirical problem, acceptance
of legislative competence, is equally distressing; for it appears that the
legislative branch is not in these cases making a considered judgment
as to the relationship between one fact and another. Rather, legislative
action is a response to difficulty experienced in securing convictions.84
80 Gainey v. United States, 380 U.S. 63, 70-71 (1965); Yee Hem v. United States, 268 U.S.
178, 185 (1925). But see dissent of Mr. Justice Douglas in Gainey v. United States, 380 U.S.
at 71-74. It should not be forgotten that presumptions which shift either the burden of
going forward or the burden of persuasion do place unique pressures upon the accused
to testify, and may in the future run counter to the expanding protections of the privilege
against self-incrimination.
81 Barrett v. United States, 322 F.2d 292, 296 (5th Cir. 1963).
82 "It may be that the Congress has the power to make presence at an illegal still a
punishable crime, but we find no clear indication that it intended to so exercise this
power." 382 U.S. at 144.
83 380 U.S. at 67-68. Mr. Justice Stewart's source of folklore was an excellent account of
the art of moonshining circa 1870-1880. ATNsoN, AFTR THE MOONSHIN.RS, BY ONE Or
THE RAmDERS (1881). Its relevance to modem techniques of organized, mobile, urban and
rural moonshining is open to some question. Assuming its relevance, however, had the
Court consulted this authority in the Romano case it would have found passages suggesting
that stills were almost always matters of joint proprietorship of all involved. Id. at 26-27.
84 1958 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4580.
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With this in mind, the defendants in Gainey countered the Govern-
ment's reference to greater legislative competence by observing that such
competence should only be deferred to when it had been truly exer-
cised.8 5 But it is only a short step from such an inquiry to the accused's
introduction of evidence to show that the legislative judgment, while
once accurate, is now obsolete. The complications would be enormous.
For the most part the above dilemma is unavoidable. Even abandon-
ing the "rational connection" test for one which would permit the shift
of the burden of persuasion only when substantial incriminating evi-
dence had been adduced8 would not mitigate the empirical difficulty.
Whether certain facts are incriminating is also an empirical inquiry.
However, this seems a less pretentious judgment for the courts to make
and does focus more on the legitimate end of the "rational connection"
test-prevention of harassment.
In summary, several distinct policies appear to underlie recent deci-
sions altering the tests for determining the constitutionality of statu-
tory criminal presumptions. The desire to promote rational jury ver-
dicts has apparently resulted in the demise of presumptions which
establish rules of prima facie evidence except insofar as the rational
connection does not clearly fail to meet the judicial standard of suffi-
ciency of the evidence. And there is strong reason to suspect that
presumptions purporting to shift the burden of persuasion to the
accused will meet with judicial disapproval, for the permanent shift of
the risk of non-persuasion to the accused even on one element of the
crime is apparently regarded as unfair. The most secure presumption
would seem to be one shifting the burden of going forward supported
by the sanction of foreclosure. When hedged by comparative conveni-
ence and some test forcing production by the prosecution of incrimi-
nating evidence the accused is protected from risk of non-existence
of evidence and harassment. In short such a presumption does not
appear to offend any policy which the Court has sought to promote,
while it does serve the legitimate end of ease of law enforcement. But
presumptions which cannot be so defended-and these are common-
may now be avoided entirely or have effect only as additional instruc-
tions to the jury.
85 Brief for Respondents, p. 4, United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63 (1965).
86 See text accompanying note 27 supra.
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